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(marriage without divorce) who was one of the authors of the European Constitution (which 
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EuZW (2016) 806, 811 (for a modification of the quote). 
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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
When the United Kingdom (UK) joined the European Union (EU) 
in 1972, a world like today’s was hardly imaginable: Over the decades, 
Europe withstood the Cold War, and in 1989 the fall of the Berlin Wall 
sounded the bell for a new era, making the way free for the Union’s 
eastward enlargement. European citizens2 live in an extraordinarily 
connected world, where frontiers, customs, different currencies and 
even national citizenship within the European Union were of less 
importance.3 However, recent developments have led to a new focus 
and different interpretations of those achievements. The Europe of 
today faces many challenges, starting with political issues such as 
financial instability in Greece, migration and its consequences for the 
Schengen Agreement,4 a strong right-wing movement in almost every 
European country and, of course, the questions regarding the future of 
Europe after Brexit. 
The outcome of the referendum of 23 June 2016,5 leading to the 
initiation of a Brexit whose details still remain to be defined, certainly 
marks an important turning point within the history of the European 
Union. The fear that all the political, legal and economic achievements 
                                                                                                             
2.  As of February 28, the EU consists of 28 Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3.  See European Parliament Eurobarometer, European Youth in 2016 (May 21, 2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2016/eye2016/eb85_1_eye_2016_analytical
_overview_en.pdf at 18 & 15 ( showing that 90% of the respondents say that it is important for 
young European to learn about the EU and how its institutions work,; however, a large majority 
of young Europeans (61%) do not want to study, undergo training or work in another EU country 
whereas only 32% would like to do so.); see also European Commission, Erasmus Impact Study 
of 2014, at 14, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/
library/study/2014/erasmus-impact_en.pdf (17.02.2017) (according to which those students who 
have participated in the international exchange program are better positioned to find their first 
job). 
4. The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 2000 O.J. L 239, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01)&from=EN 
(13.02.2017). In the so-created Schengen Area, international border checks have largely been 
abolished. 
5. EU Referendum, results, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_
referendum/results. The referendum yielded 17,410.742 (51.9%) votes to leave and 16,141.241 
(48.1%) votes to remain. 
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of the past decades will disappear and be replaced by archaic and long-
forgotten methods and strategies is present and real. And indeed it does 
not help that the political and legal evolution of this process is more 
than a little uncertain. However, the general direction has been shaped 
by British Prime Minister Theresa May, who declared on 17 January 
2017 that she is willing to negotiate the conditions of what is termed a 
‘hard Brexit’, meaning thereby the UK’s unequivocal departure from 
the European Single Market by 2019. Accordingly, the notice required 
under Art. 50 TEU6 was given on 29 March 2017.7 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court had to decide whether it was permissible for notice to 
be given without the consent of the British Parliament.8 The subsequent 
judgment of 24 January 2017 was decided by a majority of eight to 
three. The judges pointed out that a decision of such importance 
includes a considerable amount of lost rights for the British people. The 
Court therefore stated that for the Government to trigger Art. 50 TEU, 
both chambers of the UK’s Parliament had to authorize the process 
beforehand with an Act of Parliament.9 
Acknowledging the importance of the forthcoming two years of 
negotiations, the final objective for both sides should include a 
comprehensive agreement that provides legal certainty rather than the 
radical effect of leaving the EU without any further arrangements. 
                                                                                                             
6.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13 
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union - Protocols - Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental 
Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on December 13, 2007 - Tables of 
equivalences, 2012 O.J. C 326/1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML
/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN. As a subsequence of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty 
on European Union is one of the two primary treaties and forms the basis of EU law, stating 
legal principles and regulating the individual institutions. 
7.  See Article 50: Theresa May statement to MPs as letter delivered, ʙʙᴄ ɴᴇᴡs (Mar. 29, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39434293; see also Theresa May, Prime Minister, 
United Kingdom, Speech: The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU (Jan. 
17, 2017), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech. 
8.    Michael Gordon, Brexit: a challenge for the UK constitution, of the UK constitution?, 
12 E.C.L. REV. 409, 422 (2016). 
9.   R (on the application of Yalland) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2017] EWHC 630 (Admin) at 48. The ‘Brexit Bill’ passed both chambers of Parliament on 14 
March 2017. The Amendments introduced by the House of Lords were not adopted. 
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II. EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW – SETTING THE SCENE 
The legal and economic consequences of a Brexit are hard to 
determine as its uncertainty has a strong impact on several areas of 
consumers’ and businesses’ daily lives. Economically, new customs 
and migration agreements will be required, as well as new 
arrangements regarding commerce and related fields, to name only a 
few examples. 
All these aspects are connected to many different fields of law – 
a fact that makes the upcoming negotiations even harder. EU law – in 
all its complexity – has been a part of the UK’s national legislation for 
a long time. To untangle the cobweb will therefore represent one of the 
most challenging tasks during and after negotiations between the EU 
and the UK. Several options have been presented over the past months. 
But questions such as whether the UK will follow the example of 
Norway10 or Switzerland,11 or whether it will remain a ‘third party’ or 
                                                                                                             
10.   See Kaiser, Auf dem Weg zum “Brexit”, Die Europäische Union im britischen 
Verfassungsrecht, 6 EUR 593, 605 et seq. (2016). Since Norway is part of the European Free 
Trade Association (“EFTA”) as well as a member of the European Economic Area (“EEA”), its 
relationship to the EU has to be distinguished from the arrangements of the EU and Switzerland. 
According to its EEA-membership, Norway has to adopt a certain part of EU secondary law 
without having a participation right. Moreover, Norway is obliged to accept the jurisdiction of 
the EFTA-court as well as the competences of the EFTA-supervising agency. The most 
important point of the EEA is the elimination of customs duties and the adoption of almost 80 
percent of the acquis communautaire. Nevertheless, the EEA is not a customs union with a 
common customs tariff. In conclusion, Norway is probably the closest partner of the EU that is 
not part of it, considering its access to the internal market. As “consideration” for this access, 
Norway has to pay a “cohesion fee” every five years (~ 1.8 billion €). Given the British attempt 
to achieve a ‘hard Brexit’, the model seems unlikely to be followed. 
11.     See Astrid Epiney, Die Beziehungen Schweiz-EU als Modell für die Gestaltung des 
Verhältnisses Großbritanniens zur EU, in BREXIT: DIE JURISTISCHEN FOLGEN 77, 79 (Malte 
Kramme, Christian Baldus, Martin Schmidt-Kessel eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2017). 
Compared to treaties of the EU with “regular” third countries, the relationship between 
Switzerland and the EU is based on several international law treaties that contain a lot more 
specifications. This also follows from the Swiss location in the center of Europe and its EFTA-
membership the EFTA was first developed to act as a counterbalance to the EU, since it was 
founded by Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland, Great Britain and Denmark. As 
opposed to Norway and to the other EFTA-countries, Switzerland is not part of the EEA. Hence, 
Switzerland is not as integrated in the internal market as the aforementioned countries. 
Nevertheless, Switzerland adopted a huge part of the EU acquis communautaire: The 
relationship between both parties consists of two overarching treaties which include regulations 
concerning, inter alia, the free movement of people, participation in the Dublin- (considering 
migration) and Schengen-acquis, air transport and agriculture. Each treaty comprises varying 
agreements on specific areas. These can be distinguished in cooperation agreements (slight 
commitment), harmonization agreements (more intense commitment) and integration 
agreements (intense commitment) such as the Schengen agreement and the Dublin regime. 
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come up with an individual solution can hardly be predicted and are 
therefore not subjects of this contribution. Too many variables are part 
of this massive equation and too many decisions are still pending. 
Given this background, this paper aims to draw a picture of possible 
consequences for consumer law in the EU as well as in the UK. Before 
doing so, we must outline some of the more general aspects of 
European consumer law and its importance for European contract law 
and hence the free internal market. 
A. European Provisions 
European law aims to achieve the historically developed idea of a 
‘united Europe’.12 As a consequence, both the general idea of uniform 
provisions for all Member States and the preservation of national 
sovereignty13 have to be combined in a practicable way. It follows that 
the result is a highly complex legal framework that has to be accepted 
and executed by all Member States. The structure of EU law 
distinguishes between primary law, in its core consisting of the TEU 
and the TFEU,14  and secondary law. Primary law sets out the EU 
principals, institutions and competencies, whereas secondary law 
governs further specific legislative areas. The central provision in this 
respect is Art. 288 TFEU, providing for different instruments, as there 
are regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.15 
European consumer law is primarily regulated through directives and 
to a minor extent through regulations.16 
Both directives and regulations are suitable for simultaneously 
assuring uniformity and sovereignty. Regulations have a general 
application. Their legal provisions are binding and enter into force on 
the specified determined date. In order to develop a consistent 
                                                                                                             
12.  DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed. 2014). 
13.  TEU post-Lisbon supra note 6, art.4, 5. 
14.  TFEU, supra note 6. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is the 
second primary treaty. It sets forth a detailed basis of EU law as well as the scope of the EU’s 
competencies. 
15.   Ruffert, Art. 288 TFEU, in EUV/AEUV – COMMENTARY 15 (Calliess & Ruffert 
eds., München: C.H. Beck , 5th ed. 2016). Moreover, the provision binds the EU institutions as 
well as the Member States, as far as they are addressed. Cf. Cʜᴀʟᴍᴇʀs, Dᴀᴠɪᴇs & Mᴏɴᴛɪ, supra 
note 12, at 112). 
16 .  Cf. MICKLITZ, STUYCK & TERRYN, CONSUMER LAW 58 et seq. (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2010). While European consumer law is primarily regulated through directives, the 
general principles of EU law are important for the shaping and interpretation of consumer law. 
See generally TFEU, supra note 6, art. 169. 
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application of provisions throughout the EU, they do not need to be 
transposed into national law. Consequently, they offer a high standard 
of uniformity and are used where this requirement is of crucial 
importance.17 Despite operating within the EU’s legal competencies, 
they also interfere with the Member State’s sovereignty to a certain 
extent. Therefore, directives provide a different and important option. 
They are also binding, but only regarding the result to be achieved. It 
is up to the individual countries to devise their own laws on how to 
reach these goals.18 This option gives Member States the important 
decisional power on how to implement the provisions and how to make 
sure that they will fit in the national system. To adjust the respective 
outcomes, the differentiation of full harmonization and minimum 
harmonization directives is highly important. Minimum harmonization 
directives provide for a minimum standard that Member States have to 
meet, but for which they are free to introduce or maintain a higher level 
of protection. In contrast, full harmonization directives do not provide 
this option. Their standards are binding so that Member States are not 
allowed to deviate at all. The differentiation between regulations and 
full and minimum harmonization directives plays a very important role 
in consumer law, especially since the different Member States pursue 
different approaches as to where consumer law should be located 
within their respective legal systems and Member States generally 
prefer to have some leeway as to how to implement national rules.19 
The scope of the individual consumer law provisions is very 
diverse and a considerable amount of legislation has been passed. 
Important regulations tackling consumer law include: the Rome I 
Regulation,20 the Brussels Ia Regulation,21 the Air Passenger Rights 
                                                                                                             
17 .  For further argumentation, see Dorota Lecykiewicz & Stephen Weatherill, The 
Images of the Consumer in EU Law, in THE IMAGES OF THE CONSUMER IN EU LAW: 
LEGISLATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION LAW (Dorota Leczykiewcz & Stephen 
Weatherill eds., Oxford: Hart Publishing 2016). 
18.  See also Chalmers, Davies & Monti supra note 12, at 111 et seq. 
19.  France, for instance, decided to create a Consumer Code, whereas Germany has 
implemented all the provisions into the German Civil Code. 
20.  Commission Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. L 177/6 (on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations). 
21.  Commission Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. L 351/1 (on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters). 
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Regulation,22 the Online Dispute Resolution Regulation,23 the Food 
Labelling Regulation24 and the General Data Protection Regulation.25 
As far as directives are concerned, the most important ones are: the 
Consumer Rights Directive, 26  the Consumer Sales Directive, 27  the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive,28 the Consumer Credit Directive,29 
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive, 30  the Product Safety 
Directive,31 the Package Travel Directive32 and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive.33 
Given the range of areas of law affected, one cannot deny or 
underestimate the importance of European consumer law for the 
development of a European contract law. This is especially true as a 
major European principle states that interference in the respective 
national civil law of the Member States is allowed only to a limited 
extent. 34  Hence, national civil code provisions, e.g. concerning 
regulations on how a contract comes into force or regarding minors, 
cannot be regulated by European law since the EU lacks a 
corresponding competence. Therefore, one single and uniform 
European contract law does not exist. This leads to the fact that 
                                                                                                             
22.  Commission Regulation 261/2004, 2004 O.J. L 046/1 (establishing common rules on 
compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation 
or long delay of flights). 
23.  Commission Regulation 24/2013, 2013 O.J. L 165/1 (on online dispute resolution for 
consumer disputes). 
24.  Commission Regulation 1169/2011, 2011 O.J. L304/18 (on the provision of food 
information to consumers). 
25.  Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. L 119/1 (on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC). 
26.  Directive 2011/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer 
Rights, 2011 O.J. L 304/64. 
27 .  Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, 1999 O.J. L 171/12-16. 
28.  Directive 93/13/EEC of the Council of the European Communities on Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. L 095/29. 
29.  Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit 
Agreements for Consumers and Repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, 2008 O.J. L 133/66. 
30.  Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative 
Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes, 2013 O.J. L 165/63. 
31.  Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on General 
Product Safety, 2001 O.J. L 011/4. 
32.  Directive (EU) 2015/2302/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements, 2015 O.J. L 326/1. 
33.  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning 
Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market, 2005 O.J. L 149/22. 
34.  TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 6, art. 5, at 18. 
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consumer law provisions are basically the only existing – although 
concededly still fragmented – provisions of a European contract law. 
Kötz has described the phenomenon as ‘tiny islands of unified law 
within an ocean of national laws’.35 
Lately, however, there have been several attempts to unify the 
different provisions by means of analyzing and considering the contract 
law of all Member States. The Draft Common Frame of Reference36 
accordingly identified and formulated the common (contract) law 
principles of all Member States. 37  Departing from that effort, a 
Common European Sales Law (CESL)38 was drafted. However, the 
proposal was subject to much criticism39 and never passed, leading the 
European Commission back to the general approach of using directives 
and regulations. Subsequently, the EU has presented two new draft 
directives as part of the Digital Single Market Strategy,40 dealing with 
consumer contracts for the supply of digital content (Digital Content 
Directive41) and certain aspects of online and other distance sales of 
goods (Online Goods Directive42). 
                                                                                                             
35.  “In einem Meer nationalen Rechts winzige Inseln vereinheitlichten Rechts.” Cf. Kötz, 
Rechtsvereinheitlichung: Nutzen, Kosten, Methode, Ziele, 50 RABELSZ 1-50 (1986). 
36 .  See generally PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS, AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009). 
37 .  In 1980, the Danish lawyer Ole Lando founded the Commission on European 
Contract Law that elaborated the Principles of European Contract Law (“PECL”), which had 
been the starting point for the DCFR. See generally THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT 
LAW Parts I, II, & III (2002). 
38.  See generally Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Nov. 10, 2011). 
39.  The UK expressed criticism especially regarding the progress and organization of the 
Draft Common Frame of Reference, see EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE (HL), EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW: THE WAY FORWARD, REPORT WITH EVIDENCE, HL 95-I, at 3 (UK); Hugh 
Beale, The European Commission’s Common Frame of Reference Project: A Progress Report, 
2 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF CONTRACT LAW 303 (2006). The UK also underlined problematic 
issues in the CESL, such as cross-border sales, language, the right to terminate, damages for 
distress and inconvenience, telephone selling, and doorstep selling. See THE LAW COMMISSION 
AND THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION (EDS.), AN OPTIONAL COMMON EUROPEAN SALES 
LAW: ADVANTAGES AND PROBLEMS, ADVICE TO THE UK GOVERNMENT, 2011, at VIII-XI (UK) 
(offering a rather positive evaluation at the end). 
40.  European Commission, A Digital Single Market for Europe (July 2, 2017), available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/publications/digital-single-market-two-years_en. 
41.  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain 
Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, COM (2015) 634 final (Sep. 
12, 2015). 
42.  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain 
Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Online and Other Distance Sales of Goods, COM (2015) 
635 final (Sep.12, 2015). 
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B. Consumer Law Regulations and Directions 
As far as Brexit is concerned, a number of provisions will be 
subjected to major changes. Primary law itself is covered by Art. 50 
Subsection 3 TEU and will cease to be applicable to the UK two years 
after its withdrawal. However, Art. 50 TEU only states that by not 
applying EU law and its principles anymore, the ‘former’ Member 
State will not infringe any EU provisions. Consequently, whether the 
provisions of a regulation or directive will still be applicable in the 
future must be decided by the UK government and formally approved 
by its Parliament.43 
With regard to regulations, the binding force and the scope of 
application will end no later than the end of the two-year period.44 On 
the national level, the adopted European Communities Act 1972,45 
once implemented to ensure the primacy of application of EU law,46 
will have to be overruled by a new Act of Parliament. This new Act 
will form the core of Brexit, since a lot of details will need to be 
included.47 Although lately a considerable amount of regulations has 
been passed, most parts of consumer law typically consist of directives; 
hence, the respective provisions are already part of the UK’s national 
law, primarily implemented through UK statutory instruments.48 Any 
changes after a Brexit are consequently in the hands of British 
legislators. Therefore, with a reform of the current legal basis, changes 
in national law are also to be expected. The individual drafting of new 
legislation probably depends on further bilateral agreements, these 
having the EU or the individual remaining Member States on the one 
side and the UK on the other. 
C. The Role of the European Court of Justice 
In this fragmented legal environment, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) has an important role within the institutional 
structure of the EU, since it is its highest court. Through its judgments, 
the CJEU ensures, on the one hand, the uniform interpretation of EU 
                                                                                                             
43.  Basedow, Brexit und das Private- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 25 ZEUP 567, 570 (2016). 
44.   TFEU, supra note 6, art. 50, at 43. 
45.  See generally European Communities Act 1972, c. 68. 
46 .  TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 6, art. 4, at 18; Costa v. ENEL, Case 6-6/64, 
[1964] E.C.R. I-1251. 
47 .  McMillan, The Impact of Brexit upon English Contract Law, 27 KING’S LAW 
JOURNAL 420, 424 (2016). 
48.  Id. at 423 
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law for every Member State and, on the other, the compliance of 
Member States and EU institutions with EU law. 
Therefore, by deciding on questions of interpretation, the CJEU 
constitutes a part of the constant process of harmonization of law. The 
primacy of the interpretation of European legislative acts serves to 
guarantee this process. Art. 267 TFEU introduces the important 
procedure of preliminary rulings. National courts of EU Member States 
are obliged to ensure the proper application of EU law. In case of 
doubts regarding the interpretation of European legislative acts, every 
court of a Member State can request the CJEU to give clarification on 
the interpretation.49 By these means, the CJEU also enhances legal 
certainty. When it comes to directives, not only the transposition of a 
directive but also the uniform application of the transposed law can 
thereby be achieved. 
III. THE UK WITHOUT THE EU/THE EU WITHOUT THE UK 
As stated above, UK consumer law is strongly connected with EU 
law. Therefore, no major changes are expected for now, given that 
triggering Art. 50 TEU only serves to start the two-year transition 
period. At the moment, consumer law in the UK conforms to the EU 
standards and provisions, including its interpretation by the CJEU. 
In the following section of the paper we will look at some areas 
of consumer law which are currently of great importance, and we will 
analyze the possible impact of Brexit on them. We suggest grouping 
those areas into three different categories: (1) provisions which will 
likely remain unaffected; (2) provisions where the UK always had a 
different point of view than most other Member States and where 
therefore Brexit will most likely lead to changes in both UK law as well 
as European provisions and (3) areas where new developments in the 
UK might serve as a role model for European provisions. 
A. Enduring Provisions 
It is arguably simplest to start with areas in which changes are 
unlikely. To identify provisions which will remain mostly unaffected, 
we assume that this will be the case in either provisions which (a) have 
strong ties with other States and will thus have a potential to raise 
conflicts or (b) which were initiated by the UK and have respectively 
                                                                                                             
49.   TFEU, supra note 6, art. 267, at 164. 
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been incorporated in British law without major concerns. We will 
briefly introduce two possible areas. 
1. Air Passenger Rights 
An important example of such an area is the Air Passengers Rights 
Regulation. This regulation provides rights for air passengers in cases 
of denied boarding, cancellation and a delay of the flight. 50  The 
perpetuation of the current rules may be assumed given the 
international importance of the subject matter – cancelled or delayed 
flights are primarily of concern with regard to long-distance travel. 
Moreover, the regulation has a wide scope of applicability: Art. 3 states 
that the regulation applies also to non-EU carriers that depart from an 
airport of a Member State. Given this wide scope of applicability, 
autonomous provisions on a national basis after Brexit seem rather 
impracticable. From a technical point of view, however, one has to note 
that the regulation has to be adopted into UK national law after Brexit 
as it will no longer be directly applicable. 
2. Product Liability 
Product liability in the UK is regulated in the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987. 51  The Act implemented the Product Liability 
Directive,52 which introduced a regime of strict liability for damage 
arising from defective products. The provision is 30 years old and 
forms an enduring part of the UK’s national law, remaining untouched 
by any legal reform during all the years subsequent to its enactment.53 
                                                                                                             
50.   Bruggen, European air passenger rights: the concept of “flight”, 3 EUVR 2014, 233-
250. 
51. See generally Consumer Protection Act 1987, 1987 Chapter 43, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1987/43 (UK). 
52. See generally The Council of the European Communities, Council Directive 
85/374/EEC, (1985) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:31985L0374:en:HTML.  
53.  The UK was the first Member State to implement the Product Liability Directive. Since 
the introduced concept of strict liability was unknown to the UK’s legal system, it provoked a 
rather ‘strong response’ from the UK (see HOWELLS & WEATHERILL, CONSUMER PROTECTION 
LAW 234 (Oxford, 2nd ed. 2005); Mc Kenna & Co, Report for the Commission of the European 
Communities on the Application of Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products, 
p. 1, 4, Commission of the European Communities Report, (Aug. 20 1992). In that respect, the 
European Court of Justice reviewed the wording of the development risks defense in the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 but held in favor of the UK’s implementation, , Case C-300/95, 
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. 
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Hence, a change regarding any requirements or legal consequences 
seems unlikely. Any other approach would increase legal uncertainty 
and put both UK businesses and remaining EU businesses under 
enormous pressure. Additionally, it can be fairly comfortably 
concluded that product liability will not be one of the most urgent 
issues that will arise and be addressed during Brexit negotiations. Since 
the system is implemented and working, there seems to be no need in 
changing it. 
B. Areas Where Changes are Likely to be Expected 
Even though describing future changes is like ‘reading tea leaves’, 
in some areas the UK particularly struggled with the transposition of 
EU legislation into the national legal system. In contrast to the above 
discussed areas, we assume that changes are likely to expect as far as 
concepts have been introduced which deviated from British legal 
standards or have been generally unknown before. In those areas it is 
possible that the future construction and application of legal concepts 
inspired by EU law will revert to the genuinely national concepts. 
Especially if we consider that Brexit is about regaining ‘national 
sovereignty’ – which it is in the mindset of the ‘Leave’ campaign –54 
emphasizing common law and constructing provisions in a rather 
‘British’ way might be at least a possible option for conservative 
judges. Obvious areas in this context are the notion of the ‘consumer 
benchmark’ as well as the concept of ‘good faith’ in both the law of 
unfair contract terms and also unfair commercial practices law. 
1. Consumer Benchmark 
The question of how consumers are perceived in the eyes of the 
law – and what expectations they have to live up to – remains one of 
the key points in consumer law. The benchmark of the average 
consumer 55  has been introduced and constantly developed in 
judgments of the CJEU, who defined the European consumer as 
                                                                                                             
54. The ‘Leave’ campaign was advertised with slogans as ‘Vote Leave, take back control’ 
and statements as ‘The European Court already overrules us on everything from how much tax 
we pay, to who we can let in and out of the country, and on what terms’ showing that they 
believe the EU threatens or reduces the sovereignty of the British people; materials available at 
e.g. http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html.  
55. See Leczykiewicz & Weatherill, The Images of the Consumer in EU Law, in THE 
IMAGES OF THE CONSUMER IN EU LAW: LEGISLATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION 
LAW 1, 8, (Dorota Leczykiewcz & Stephen Weatherill eds., Oxford: Hart Publishing 2016). 
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rational and confident. The Court’s jurisprudence states that consumers 
are considered to be reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant 
and circumspect. 56  The consumer benchmark thereby follows an 
approach that is based on the information paradigm – focusing on the 
enormous relevance of information within consumer protection law. It 
has been developed in terms of unfair commercial practices 57  and 
consequently has had to be transposed into other aspects of consumer 
law.58  Thus, European consumer law generally is premised on the 
rational and confident consumer when it comes to consumer protection 
and its legal structuring. Nevertheless, how a court in one of the 28 
Member States defines ‘rational’ may differ. 
Different occasions have shown that, under the consumer 
benchmark in the UK, the rational and average consumer is very well 
informed and able to act autonomously – and hence in less need of 
protection.59 The following case60 may serve as an illustrative example: 
British Airways sued Ryanair for trademark infringement and 
malicious falsehood in respect of a comparative press advertisement 
released by Ryanair.61 The advertisement referred primarily to the price 
difference between the two airlines regarding their flights to several 
explicitly named airports. However, although named in the same 
manner, it was not mentioned that British Airways offered their flights 
to the main airports whereas Ryanair used smaller airports in the same 
region that were not as close to the specific cities at issue. The British 
High Court ruled that the average and reasonable consumer could be 
expected to be well informed and would therefore not be misled by the 
comparison of prices in relation to two different airports. 
By contrast, in Germany for example, the rational consumer was 
considered to need significantly more protection. Several courts had to 
deal with a comparable situation to that of British Airways v Ryanair. 
                                                                                                             
56.   See generally Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Koln eV v. Mars GmbH, 
Case C-470/93; Gut Springenheide and Rudolf Tusky v. Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt- 
Amt fur Lebensmitteluberwachung, Case C-210/96. 
57. See generally Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fur Branntwein 
(Federal Monopoly Administration for Spirits) C-120/78; Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co. 
OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH, Case C-220/98. 
58. Andreas Wiebe, Das Leid des Verbrauchers mit dem Verbraucherleitbild, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT KÖHLER 804, 811 (Tobias Lettl et al. eds., München: C.H. Beck 
2014). 
59. Cf. Straetmans, Misleading Practices, The Consumer Information Model and Consumer 
Protection, 5 EUCML 199, 204 (2016). 
60. British Airways v. Ryanair 2001 FLR 541. 
61. The advertisement described British Airways as ‘Expensive BA….DS’. 
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Specifically, the denomination of a (small) destination airport in 
Germany was similar to the main airport in the same region, e.g. 
Frankfurt (a.M.) and Frankfurt (Hahn).62 The flights to the smaller 
airport (provided by a low-budget airline) were cheaper, but those 
airports were badly connected with the public transportation system 
and 80-120 kilometers outside of the cities in question – these being 
facts about which the airlines did not openly inform consumers. 
According to the German Higher Regional Courts, rational consumers 
were misled in that situation and could not be expected to know and 
investigate the difference between two similarly promoted and named 
airports.63 
Although there is no doubt that the approach is based on the same 
standard of a rational and responsible consumer, the courts in different 
Member States apply different levels of protection. It has been shown 
that the UK has followed a more liberal approach. Once the binding 
force of European law disappears in the future, an even deeper 
divergence in this respect seems very likely. 
2. Unfair Contract Terms and Unfair Commercial Practices 
Beginning in the 1960s courts developed mechanisms for 
protection against unfair contract terms in contracts. Exemption and 
exclusion of liability clauses, the question of the notice (surprising 
clauses) and invalid types of contracts were the cornerstones of the case 
law64 that originally was closely connected with the concepts of ‘undue 
influence’ and ‘unconscionability’.65 It is noteworthy that the personal 
scope of this case law was not limited to consumers in the European 
sense. The case law was later partly summarized by the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act of 1977 (UCTA), which considerably restricted the 
effectiveness of exemption and limitation clauses not only in consumer 
contracts but also in commercial contracts.66 The Act included a list of 
terms automatically ineffective as well as terms that needed to be tested 
for their ‘reasonableness’.67 
                                                                                                             
62. OLG Hamburg Dec/ 19, 2002, 5 U 137/02 Frankfurt-Hahn. 
63. See also OLG Köln Dec. 5, 2003, 6 U 107/03 Flughafen Niederrhein (Düsseldorf). 
64. For common law on contract terms cf. O’SULLIVAN & HILLIARD, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACT 192 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3d ed. 2008); Whittaker, in 1 CHITTY ON 
CONTRACTS 15-002 (Hugh Beale ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 32nd ed. 2015). 
65. HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 274 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2003). 
66. Whittaker, supra note 64, at 15-003. 
67. For details on the reasonableness test, compare O’Sullivan & Hilliard, supra, note 64, 
at 201. 
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In 1994, the UK then transposed the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts68 into national law in a ‘minimalistic manner’.69 
Essentially, this means the British legislature mostly copied and pasted 
the text of the directive word-for-word into the Unfair Terms on 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994, which was slightly amended by 
the Unfair Terms on Consumer Regulations 1999.70 Besides the limited 
personal scope and the extended scope of application in comparison to 
UCTA and the common law, the major legal problem brought by the 
directive was the introduction of ‘good faith’ and the concept of a broad 
general clause. Although the introduction of this concept was seen as 
presenting ‘a fascinating challenge to the traditions of the common 
law’71 which ‘is mysterious and exciting to an English lawyer’,72 there 
was nevertheless a major dispute on how to deal with this concept.73 
Some argued that ‘good faith’ requires a test of the contract’s 
substantive fairness and an assessment whether there is a significant 
imbalance between the parties.74 Others saw a mixture of substantive 
and procedural fairness and emphasized that the concept of 
‘reasonableness’ known from UCTA was already familiar. 75  A 
different set of authors, by contrast, argued that the notion 
predominantly pertains to procedural fairness, as the concept is known 
in German law,76 and thus some scholars demanded that the United 
Kingdom import criteria from the civil law concept of ‘good faith’. But, 
as always, the truth normally lies somewhere in between: 
Consequently, it was also argued that it would be improper to define 
the concept in accordance with the tradition of any single Member State 
                                                                                                             
68.    Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 L 95/29. 
69.  Whittaker, supra note 64, at 15-005. 
70.  Pfeiffer, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION, Einl., zu Art. 1 RL 93/13/EWG 
(Grabitz & Hilf eds., München: C.H. Beck, 40th ed. 2009). 
71.  Collins, Good Faith in European Contract Law, 14 OJLS 229, 245-249 (1994); see 
also Beatson, The Incorporation of the EC Directive on Unfair Consumer Contracts into English 
Law, 6 ZEUP 957, 964 (1998). 
72.  Collins, supra note 71, at 245, 249. 
73.  For a summary, compare O’SULLIVAN & HILLIARD, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 210 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2006). 
74.  SMITH, CONTRACT, 48 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 5, 8 (1995). 
75.  Collins, supra note 71, at 249. 
76.  Beale, Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAw 243 (Jack Beatson & Daniel 
Friedman eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995). 
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and, as such, that it had to be interpreted autonomously from a 
European perspective and with a comparative method.77 
In a far-reaching decision, the House of Lords voted in favor of 
this European view on the Unfair Terms on Consumer Regulations 
1999.78 They reasoned that the construction of provisions in national 
law had always to be oriented on the respective directive they were 
based on. This results from the prevailing nature of European Union 
legislation and the interpretation of EU law by the CJEU,79 which 
follows a more purpose-based approach than British courts were used 
to.80 The House of Lords adopted this style of interpretation in its 
decision by taking the recitals and legislative aims into account.81 The 
judgment had a major impact on the understanding of European private 
law in the UK. In a way, it confirmed the thesis that with the 
implementation of ‘good faith’ in the UK, ‘English contract lawyers 
are forced to become comparative lawyers’82. However, after Brexit it 
is not unlikely that courts will start to interpret the transposing statues 
in isolation from the directive, which could lead to different outcomes. 
With regard to the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices 
(UCPD),83 the UK legal system had to deal with a similar challenge as 
the European Union’s law introduced subsidiary84 and broad general-
clauses,85 operating with the concept of ‘good faith’.86 Considering the 
                                                                                                             
77. Whittaker, Assessing the Fairness of Contract Terms: The Parties’ ‘Essential 
Bargain’, its Regulatory Context and the Significance of the Requirement of Good Faith, 12 
ZEUP 75, 89 (2004); Weatherill, Prospects for the Development of European Private Law 
through ‘Europeanisation’ in the European Court – the Case for the Directive on Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts, 3 ERPL 307, 318 (1995) (speaking of “comparative europeanisation”). 
78.  Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc. [2001] UKHL 52, 
[2002] 1 A.C. 481. 
79.  For an introduction, see HEIDERHOFF, EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 16 (Heidelberg: 
C.F. Müller, 4th ed. 2016,). 
80.  Whittaker, supra note 64, at 15-007. 
81.  Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc. [2001] UKHL 52, 
[2002] 1 A.C. 481. 
82.  Beatson, The Incorporation of the EC Directive on Unfair Consumer Contracts into 
English Law, 6 ZEUP 957, 968 (1998). 
83.     Directive 2005/29/EC, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2005:149:0022:0039:EN:PDF.  
84.  The general clause is subsidiary to the so-called ‘minor’ general-clauses of Art. 6 
UCPD (aggressive commercial practices) and Art. 8 UCPD (misleading commercial practices). 
85.  UCPD, Art. 5. 
86.  ’Good faith’ is there part of the definition of professional diligence. UCPD, Art. 2. 
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liberal British approach towards unfair competition,87 Brexit might be 
a starting point for a diverging development in unfair commercial 
practices law in the UK and the EU.88 
Especially as regards the argument that cross-border shopping by 
consumers serves to enhance the EU’s single market,89 courts will need 
to find other justifications for the protection of consumers. Considering 
the skepticism toward this concept in respect of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive,90 a recourse to common law concepts does not appear 
unlikely. This also shows the dependence on methodological questions 
when assessing Brexit’s impact on consumer law. 
C. UK Rules as a Role Model for the EU? 
Finally, in our view changes are most likely to be expected where 
the UK already in the past expressed concerns over European 
provisions. Brexit will enable the UK to depart from European 
standards. By doing so the UK might also have the possibility to react 
sooner to current developments than the EU, thereby functioning even 
as a potential role model for European law. On the other hand, Brexit 
might ‘rejuvenate’ European projects, which were abandoned due to 
the UK´s resistance. The following three areas of law might serve as 
examples: 
1. Consumer Contract Law Provisions 
After a process of partial consolidation of some provisions in EU 
consumer law, the Consumer Rights Directive was introduced and 
                                                                                                             
87.  Wendland, Die Auswirkungen des Brexit auf das EU Wettbewerbsrecht, in BREXIT 
UND DIE JURISTISCHEN FOLGEN 231, 244 (Kramme, Baldus & Schmidt-Kessel, eds., Baden-
Baden: Nomos 2017). 
88.  Cf. Collins, Harmonisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial 
Practices, 73 THE MODERN L. REV. 89, 116 (2010); Collins, Good Faith in Euorpean Contract 
Law, 14 OJLS 229,238 (1994). 
89.  The notion that the implementation of the EU’s single market is to be achieved by 
the consumer purchasing across the national borders is a major justification for the 
harmonisation of EU consumer law, therefore see e.g. HEIDERHOFF, EUROPÄISCHES 
PRIVATRECHT 9 (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 4th ed. 2016); see also RIESENHUBER, EU-
VERTRAGSRECHT 44 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2013). 
90.  Beatson, The Incorporation of the EC Directive on Unfair Consumer Contracts into 
English Law, 6 ZEUP 957, 959 (1998); see also Witthaker, Assessing the Fairness of Contract 
Terms: The Parties’ ‘Essential Bargain’, its Regulatory Context and the Significance of the 
Requirement of Good Faith, 12 ZEUP 75 (2004) with further references. 
1492 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:5 
adopted.91 The instrument aims to enable a high consumer protection 
standard and strengthen the functioning of the internal market. 92 
Therefore, it can be seen as an important step toward a further 
harmonization of consumer law within the internal market. It prescribes 
not only general information requirements that have to be provided in 
consumer contracts and special information requirements for distance 
or off-premises contracts,93 but also the right of withdrawal in distance 
and off-premises contracts. The information requirements and the right 
of withdrawal are based on two different regulatory directions in EU 
consumer law. While the former advances the goal of facilitating well-
informed decisions by consumers and thereby removing any 
information asymmetry between consumers and businesses,94 the latter 
aims to protect the consumer from hasty decisions and gives them a 
right of reconsideration.95 
In 2013 the UK implemented the directive in the Consumer 
Contracts Regulation,96 and this was later followed in 2015 by the 
elaboration of an extraordinarily advanced Consumer Protection 
regime which included the Consumer Rights Act (CRA)97  and the 
Consumer Protection Act (Amendment) Regulation.98 The CRA not 
only brought enormous changes to consumer law on a national basis 
                                                                                                             
91.  The Directive replaced the Distance Selling Directive and the Directive on Contracts 
negotiated away from business premises, Directive 97/7/EC of European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. L 144/19, 
and modified both the Consumer Sales Directive, Council Directive 85/557/EEC to Protect the 
Consumer in Respect to Contracts Negotiated Away From Business Premises, 1985 O.J. L. 
372/31, and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
92.   Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer 
Rights, Amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council , 2011 O.J. L. 304/64 Art. 2 
93.   Parliament and Council Directive on Consumer Rights, supra note 91, art. 5, 6 
94 .  SCHULZE & ZOLL, EUROPÄISCHES VERTRAGSRECHT 148 (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
2015). 
95.  Id. at 186; RIESENHUBER, EU-VERTRAGSRECHT 87 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2013); 
critically: Horst Eidenmüller, Why Withdrawal Rights?, 7 ERCL 1, 15 (2011), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/26ef/b94e6b6c56c850827d1fca497522179fe526.pdf. 
96.  The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) 
Regulations 2013 Statutory Instrument 2013 No. 3134, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/2013/3134/pdfs/uksi_20133134_en.pdf.  
97. Consumer Rights Act 2015, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/
contents/enacted.  
98.  Consumer Protection Act (Amendment) Regulations 2014, https://www.gov.uk/gove
rnment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/300129/bis-14-693-consumer-protection-
amendment-regulations-2014.pdf.  
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but also summarized different aspects of consumer law in one piece of 
legislation. This consolidation of consumer law in the UK turned out 
to be one of the most sophisticated and forward-looking legislative acts 
within the European Union. 
Among its other aspects, the legislation creates a new type of 
classification for digital content contracts and thus ensures a high level 
of consumer protection. 99  The provisions highlight the enormous 
relevance of these contracts in the field of consumer law, especially in 
comparison to other Member States. Some of these countries, e.g. 
Germany and France, do not have any manner of special provisions 
when it comes to contracts relating to digital content.100 Other Member 
States, such as the Netherlands, do provide a legal framework but refer 
to an already existing regime of remedies.101 By contrast, the CRA 
creates a special regime of remedies for consumers that can be raised 
against retailers in case of non-conformity with the contract.102 
Given the importance of the topic, the EU also presented two new 
draft directives as part of the Digital Single Market Strategy,103 dealing 
with consumer contracts for the supply of digital content (Digital 
Content Directive) and certain aspects of online and other distance sale 
of goods (Online Goods Directive).104 It is certainly true that both the 
EU and the UK approaches concur in some aspects; however, they also 
show some differences.105 
                                                                                                             
99.  Consumer Rights Act Explanatory Notes, Background, No. 5, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/notes/division/2/1.  
100 . European Parliament, Contracts for Supply of Digital Content to Consumers, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581980/EPRS_BRI(2016)581980_
EN.pdf, at 4. 
101 . European Parliament, Contracts for Supply of Digital Content to Consumers, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581980/EPRS_BRI(2016)581980_
EN.pdf, at 3. 
102. Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 3, s. 42. 
103. European Commission, A Digital Single Market for Europe, 08.11.2016, 
https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/publications/digital-single-market-two-years_en (Feb. 7, 2017). 
104. See proposal for a Digital Content Directive: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0634&from=EN; see proposal for an Online 
Goods Directive: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri
=CELEX:52015PC0635&from=EN; the Digital Content Directive and Online Goods Directive 
are the result of a process of consolidation undertaken after the Proposal on the Common 
European Sales Law (CESL) could not pass the legislation process (see in the Explanatory 
Memorandum of both proposals, p. 7: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0634&from=EN). 
105. Mánko & Tereszkiewicz, Digitale Inhalte nach britischem Consumer Rights Act 
2015 unter dem Eindruck des Brexit, in BREXIT UND DIE JURISTISCHEN FOLGEN 279 et. seq. 
(Kramme, Baldus & Schmidt-Kessel, eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2017). 
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The differences can already be seen when it comes to the 
definition of digital content. The CRA defines the term digital content 
in Sec. 2 Subsection 9 as ‘data which are produced and supplied in 
digital form’, but it excludes digital services pursuant to Sec. 
33 Subsection 4. The definition of digital content and hence the scope 
of the Digital Content Directive is broader compared to the CRA, as it 
does not exclude digital services. This leads to a higher level of 
consumer protection in the directive as, under 
Sec. 49 Subsection 1 CRA, the remedies for a contract of services 
depend on a breach of reasonable care and skill. 
Moreover, the burden of proof in the CRA and the Digital Content 
Directive differ: Whereas the rules in the CRA correspond with the 
Consumer Sales Directive,106 the burden of proof in the Digital Content 
Directive leads to a lower standard of consumer protection on the 
European level.107 
Another difference between the CRA and the proposal for a 
Digital Content Directive concerns the right to reject the goods. 
Whereas the proposal for the directive does not allow the consumer to 
reject the goods directly, instead specifying a prior right to repair or 
replacement, the CRA offers the option to immediately reject within a 
short time period – i.e. 30 days – pursuant to Sec. 20. 
Despite these differences, both the CRA and the European 
proposal show the importance of consumer law and adapt it to the 
modern developments of digitalization. The legal remedies and 
systems chosen by the UK are not at all unsuitable approaches, giving 
the consumer indeed a wide field of options. Some of the terms even 
                                                                                                             
106.  See Council Directive 1999/44, art. 4, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EC) The Consumer 
Sales Directive, which deals with contracts in regards to consumer goods between a consumer 
as a buyer and a seller as a business, provides for the rights of consumers where the goods are 
not in conformity with the contract. 
107.  Art. 5 Subsection 3 of the Consumer Sales Directive shifts the burden of proof, 
stating that non-conformity of the goods is presumed to have existed at the time of delivery, but 
only where the non-conformity becomes apparent within a time period of six months after the 
delivery of the goods. See Council Directive 1999/44/EC, art. 5 § 3, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EC). 
Sec. 42 Subsection 9 CRA states that digital content that does not conform to the contract within 
a period of six months is presumed to have been supplied as not conforming to the contract. See 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 42(9) (U.K.). In contrast, Art. 9 of the Digital Content 
Directive shifts the burden of proof to the supplier but does not contain any presumption at all. 
See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, at art. 9, COM (2015) 
634 final (Sep. 21, 2015). 
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provide a higher consumer protection level as compared to the two draft 
directives. 
2. Privacy Law 
As technological progress rapidly develops and new innovations 
flood the existing market every day, data protection has become a 
critically important political issue. Due to the fact that people are 
encouraged to pay with their data instead of money,108 data protection 
needs to be regulated in a globalized context. The groundbreaking 
decisions of the CJEU regarding Facebook109 and Google Spain110 also 
impact the relations between the EU and the United States of America 
(US), and after a Brexit they will also effect relations with the UK as a 
national player. For the first time, the Court established in the Google 
Spain decision the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’.111 This crucial step 
towards more consumer protection in the field of data protection law 
was followed by massive legal discussions and led to further initiatives 
regarding the development of a uniform European privacy law. The 
recently established rights were further strengthened because the CJEU 
repealed in its Facebook decision the ‘safe harbor agreement’ between 
the European Commission and the US. Since the CJEU found the gap 
between the respective protection standards of the EU and the US to be 
substantive, the agreement is now in the process of re-negotiation.112 
Not only did the standard of privacy law change within less than one 
year, one of Europe´s most important trading partners, the US, was also 
deeply affected. The involved companies had to change their storage 
policy, and, up to now, Facebook has been trying to cope with the 
responsibility of enabling users to delete (and by this we mean 
permanently delete) data that they do not want to remain in the internet. 
In order to minimize the enormous impact of these decisions for 
the European Member States, the new General Data Protection 
                                                                                                             
108.  See Kerber, Digital Markets, Data and Privacy: Competition Law, Consumer Law 
and Data Protection, 65 GRUR INT. 639 (2016). 
109.  See Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14, 2015, available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362. 
110.  See Google Spain SL v. Angencia Espanola de proteccion de Datos (AEPD), Case 
C-131/12, 2014, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A62012CJ0131. 
111.  Id. See also Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 364/1, arts. 
7-8, 2000 O.J. C 2000. 
112.  Skouris, Leitlinien der Rechtsprechung des EuGH zum Datenschutz, 35 NVWZ 
1359, 1363 (2016). 
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Regulation will come into force on 25 May 2018. Given the short time-
period, it seems likely that the regulation’s scope of application will 
also include the UK, at least for the moment. Theoretically, a different 
data protection regime after Brexit is possible. Notwithstanding that, it 
seems to be more reasonable to keep the same standard in order to 
improve and ensure the enforcement of a single level of data protection. 
Businesses are therefore encouraged to adopt the necessary changes to 
ensure conformity with current legal provisions.113 
As today’s world cannot be imagined without millions of data 
processing programs sending data from one point in the world to 
another each second, parallel data protection on the global level seems 
crucial in the future. Although developments are practically in their 
infancy, a uniform code at least for a geographical Europe would be 
considered an important step. The UK’s participation therefore offers 
an important option, especially for facilitating the smooth functioning 
of business-to-consumer (b2c) as well as business-to-business (b2b) 
transactions within the EU. In the long run, unified codices of such a 
nature might also be a worldwide option. Since international businesses 
have to adjust their policies regarding EU standards, they might as well 
change those policies in and for the US and elsewhere, providing a 
uniform standard of data protection. 
Nevertheless, the legal issues in this field of law change very 
quickly. After Brexit the UK will be able to decide on a national level 
and hence react considerably faster to new challenges than the EU with 
its complex legislative process. The chance to become a role model by 
implementing innovative and preventive provisions is strong, and this 
dynamic could most certainly encourage the EU to follow the UK’s 
chosen path or at least consider it. 
3. Enforcement 
The enforcement of rights is of enormous importance, as without 
functioning enforcement, consumer protection law provisions remain 
merely law on the books. Unfortunately, the enforcement of European 
consumer laws is rather weak as – in part due to the principle of 
procedural autonomy114 – hardly any harmonized enforcement rules 
                                                                                                             
113.  Geminn & Schaller, Brexit im Datenschutz?, ZD-AKTUELL 05320 (2016). 
114.  See Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fur 
das Saarland, Case 33/76, 1979 E.C.R. 1989. 
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exist. 115  It is only relatively recently that the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Directive (ADR Directive) and the Online Dispute 
Resolution Regulation (ODR Regulation) were introduced. Most 
noteworthy is the fact that there exist neither class actions116 on a 
European level nor a European Consumer Agency that is comparable 
to the Federal Trade Commission.117 
The CRA, however, not only brought significant changes to the 
rights of consumers in consumer contracts in the UK but also 
implemented changes in the enforcement of rights. By introducing 
class actions into the law of the UK, a new procedural mechanism for 
hearing competition law infringements before the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (CAT) has been implemented. The class action suit provided 
for in the CRA is based on an opt-out mechanism118 similar to the class-
action mechanism in the US and aims to enhance the enforcement of 
rights. 
In the UK the enforcement of rights in the field of consumer 
protection has been changed by the implementation of the Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA) in 1 April 2014, which since that date 
has the power to investigate matters and bring a claim to court.119 The 
authority has been created in order to make enforcement more efficient 
and effective and to streamline its structure. The CMA is responsible 
not only for consumer protection but also for promoting competition 
for the benefit of consumers. It thereby takes a consumer-orientated 
approach as it investigates consumer issues and links the protection of 
competition directly to consumers’ interests. Discussions on 
developing a more consumer-linked approach in the enforcement of 
consumer and competition law have been ongoing also in other EU 
                                                                                                             
115.  Regulation 861/2007/EC of July 11, 2007, Establishing a European Small Claims 
Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1 (EC) has been introduced by the EU, but has no wide practical 
influence because many consumers are unaware of it and the entailed small claims procedure; 
see also ECC-Net European Small Claims Procedure Report, (Sep. 2012), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/docs/small_claims_210992012_en.pdf. 
116.  Different types of class actions have been introduced in the law of certain European 
Member States. France, Italy, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Poland, Romania 
and Belgium created class actions, for an overview cf. EBERS, RECHTE, RECHTSBEHELFE UND 
SANKTIONEN IM UNIONSPRIVATRECHT 774 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2016). 
117.  For further references, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Federal Trade Commission Privacy 
Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 2016). 
118.  See Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 81, sch. 8 (UK). 
119. CMA, CONSUMER PROTECTION: ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 2, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/546521/cma58-
consumer-protection-enforcement-guidance.pdf.  
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Member States, e.g. concerning the enforcement procedures of the 
Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) in Germany.120 While small 
changes have already been introduced in Germany – enlarging the 
Federal Cartel Offices competence to investigate businesses’ repeated 
infringements of consumer law provisions121 – the introduction of a 
full-fledged consumer and competition law authority comparable to the 
CMA is still missing. The CMA can thereby be seen as an important 
and effective body of consumer rights’ enforcement; the rights that it 
advances and its clear structure of enforcement can be seen as 
significantly progressive. 
The above-mentioned ADR Directive has been transposed into 
national law by the Consumer Rights Act and implements an 
alternative dispute resolution procedure. This means of enforcements 
aims to enhance the level of consumer protection and promote dispute 
resolution outside of courts. 122  Consumers thereby have access to 
redress in a simpler and more efficient way. Businesses are obliged to 
make consumers aware of relevant alternative dispute resolution 
providers.123  It remains to be seen if this transposed directive will 
continue to be part of the national law after Brexit. 
The ODR Regulation additionally implements an online dispute 
resolution instrument on a European level in order to promote trade 
within the single market and simplify the enforcement of consumer 
rights concerning distance contracts within the internal market context. 
Accordingly, the ODR Regulation has not been implemented into 
national law, instead being directly applicable. It cannot be foreseen if 
this regulation will still be a part of the national law after Brexit. 
                                                                                                             
120.  Opinion of the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) to the Draft Amendment 
to the German Competition Act (July 25, 2016), p. 2 & 28, available at: 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme-
Regierungsentwurf_GWB9.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
121. Cf. Amendment to § 32e GWB, German Competition Act, available at: 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/114/1811446.pdf (24.3.2017). The law was accepted by 
the German Bundestag on March 9, 2017 and scheduled for discussion on March 31, 2017 in 
the second chamber, the German Bundesrat. 
122.   See Directive 2013/11 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2009 O.J. L 165/63. 
123.  See id. 
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IV. ‘A MARKET SOLUTION’ 
Notwithstanding the importance of analyzing all potential 
statutory consequences and mechanisms, the final outcome of Brexit 
will primarily influence the law on the books. However, a more 
economic view towards the problems of Brexit might help in order to 
streamline new approaches and amplify our perspectives. From an 
economic point of view, changes regarding consumer law are a key 
factor that will influence further trading relations. 
The main task of the UK’s government will be to find a practical 
and acceptable solution to all the legal problems. However, legal reality 
and legal theory do not always coincide. Apart from the UK’s 
governmental decision, economic aspects will shape the reality for UK 
businesses and companies. Therefore, the key question that has to be 
addressed will be: Can UK businesses economically afford an 
alteration and – particularly – a lowering of consumer protection 
standards? 
Any lowering of the current consumer law standards will 
encourage continental EU consumers to buy their products somewhere 
within the EU instead of the UK, while at the same time also prompting 
UK consumers to buy from businesses located in the EU. 124 
Additionally, possible trade customs or prohibitive taxes are an actual 
danger that will certainly influence the price of goods and shipping. 
The risks of losing customers and a noticeable decline in sales should 
be sounded out carefully by the UK’s businesses. One is drawn to the 
conclusion that UK’s industry might retain a high interest in matching 
the EU consumer protection level in order not to lose customers in the 
EU market. If UK businesses want to offer goods and services to EU 
consumers, they are legally required to comply with the EU standards. 
As Art. 6 para. 1 Rome I Regulation suggests the applicable law in a 
conflict of laws case depends on the consumers’ habitual residence as 
well as whether the undertaking ‘pursues’ (Art. 6 para. lit. b leg. cit.) 
business in this country. Assuming a customer residing in the EU, the 
EU consumer protection standard would apply. 125  Consequently, a 
                                                                                                             
124.  The question of competing legal regimes and to what extent consumers are aware 
of different legal consequences was, however, broadly debated in context of the Common 
European Sales Law. See e.g. Dannemann, The CESL as Optional Sales Law: Interactions with 
English and German Law, in THE COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW IN CONTEXT 708, 722 
(Vogenauer & Dannemann eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013). 
125.  Choice of clause clauses would not prevail, if the standard of the chosen law 
deviates from the EU standard (Art. 6 para. 2 Rome I Regulation); although it is highly disputed 
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Brexit a would have no negative effects on consumers purchasing from 
UK businesses within the EU. 
The other way around, EU companies that are used to a possibly 
higher EU standard might be more competitive in the UK, since they 
could – voluntarily – offer for consumers more favorable conditions 
than UK businesses do.126 Given the scenario that the UK legislature 
decides to lower its consumer protections standards in comparison to 
the EU provisions, businesses could close that gap by contractual 
provisions. Guarantees and other options could be included in either 
contract terms or corporate social responsibility agreements so as to 
ensure EU consumers’ rights also within the UK. That might also be 
feasible given that UK businesses which offer their services in the EU 
and enter into contract with EU consumers will in any event – even if 
UK law purportedly governs the contract under a choice-of-law clause 
– be subject to EU law where the law of the domicile of the EU 
consumer provides for a higher level of protection, this being an 
element of EU law pursuant to Art. 6 para. 2 Rome I Regulation.127 
However, it has to be questioned how successful such a strategy will 
be if only part of the businesses in the UK opt to apply the higher 
standards of the EU.128 
Presently the question of a divergence between EU and UK 
consumer protection standards do not have much of importance as a 
certain conformity of British law has been shown to be likely and there 
have not yet been any severe pronouncements on the future of 
consumer law in the UK. But since EU law will continue to grow and 
develop, further standards and legislative programs (e.g. in privacy 
                                                                                                             
what ‘pursuing’ means – especially in context of distance and online sales – it is at least common 
that ‘pursuing’ means wilful behaviour to sell goods in a certain country, cf. Callies, Art. 6 Rome 
I Regulation, in: Rome Regulations – Commentary, 154 seqq. (Callies ed., Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International, 2d ed. 2015) 
126.  Obviously, this is only one possibility: For EU or UK business another possible way 
would be, to operate with two sets of standard terms (one for goods offered in UK and one in 
the EU). However, if we assume rational undertakings this depends on how valuable the sold 
good is and how big the actual legal difference is, whether they would choose this option. 
127.  Callies, Art. 6 Rome I Regulation, in ROME REGULATIONS – COMMENTARY 154 et 
seq. (Callies ed., Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 2015). 
128.  The assumption that consumers behave as rational as often suggested (and thus 
would pursue their rights in court) has been questioned by research concerning the consumer 
behaviour. For the UK, see in a very condensed manner Twigg-Flessner, Ability of Consumers 
to Enforce Their Rights – A UK-Perspective, in CONSUMER LAW AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 
211 (Heiderhoff & Schulze eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2016), but this is question is different 
from the fact that granting additional warranty rights or guaranties to consumers is a competitive 
feature of good. 
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law) will be introduced. And after Brexit those provisions will not 
apply in the United Kingdom. Even if the benchmark of an average 
consumer is taken as a starting point, different standards of protection 
will not remain unnoticed. Businesses will (with good reason) fear a 
considerable loss of customers and a decline in sales. The UK would 
be well advised to follow the example of Switzerland129 and keep up 
with the changes made in EU (consumer) contract law on a voluntary 
basis.130 
If, however, the UK legislature decides to lower its consumer 
protections standards in comparison to the EU provisions, businesses 
could close that gap by contractual provisions. Guarantees and other 
options could be included in either contract terms or corporate social 
responsibility agreements so as to ensure EU consumers’ rights also 
within the UK. That might also be feasible given that UK businesses 
which offer their services in the EU and enter into contract with EU 
consumers will in any event – even if UK law purportedly governs the 
contract under a choice-of-law clause – be subject to EU law where the 
law of the domicile of the EU consumer provides for a higher level of 
protection, this being an element of EU law pursuant to 
Art. 6 para. 2 Rome I Regulation.131 However, it has to be questioned 
how successful such a strategy will be if only part of the businesses in 
the UK opt to apply the higher standards of the EU. 
Apart from the legal problems that might be solved by contractual 
agreements, enforcement seems one of the most important legal issues. 
What will happen if a dispute arises between a UK business and an EU 
consumer and the UK has bound itself contractually to the higher 
standards known in the EU? Can the voluntary provisions then be 
interpreted in the light of the jurisprudence by the CJEU? Since Prime 
Minister May declared the UK’s intention not to be bound by any 
decision of the CJEU after Brexit, the respective judgments of the 
CJEU will not apply directly within the UK borders.132 However, if UK 
businesses decide to be bound by EU provisions voluntarily, the Prime 
Minister’s stated intention might not be advisable: 
                                                                                                             
129.  Epiney, Die Beziehungen Schweiz-EU als Modell für die Gestaltung des 
Verhältnisses Großbritanniens zur EU, in BREXIT, - DIE JURISTISCHEN FOLGEN 77, 83 (Kramme, 
Baldus & Schmidt-Kessel, eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2017). 
130.  This has, for different areas of law, previously been described as the ‘Brussels Effect 
by Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. L. REV. 1 (comparing the situation created by the EU 
to the well-known California effect). 
131.   Callies, supra note 127, at 154. 
132.  Cf. May, supra, note 7. 
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While CJEU decisions will clearly no longer be binding on UK 
courts, the guidelines and constructions of the CJEU should at least be 
considered by UK courts when interpreting contractual provisions (or 
legal provisions which are rooted in EU law and not changed after 
Brexit) since one can correctly state that many EU consumer law 
directives and regulations came alive only through their interpretation 
by the CJEU.133 The problem can be compared to the question whether 
CJEU decisions are binding on national courts where the national 
legislature decided to transpose a directive so as to also encompass B2B 
relations.134 Yet in areas in which British legal academics and courts 
have struggled with the CJEU’s arguments, it is often common law 
concepts that receive greater emphasis, as can be seen concerning the 
concept of good faith. The legal lines there are indeed quite vague. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
It can be shown that consumer law in the UK after Brexit will 
likely fall into one of three groupings, one area which will remain rather 
constant (e.g. product liability law and air passenger rights), one area 
where a divergence from the European standard is likely (e.g. unfair 
contract terms and unfair commercial practices law) and one area 
where post-Brexit changes might even function as a role model for the 
further development of consumer law in the EU (e.g. enforcement and 
privacy law). The differentiation between the first two groups may be 
based on the fact that any kind of deprivation or loss of concrete 
consumer rights and remedies will be more difficult to establish than a 
change of vague legal institutions like the notion of the average 
consumer. 
By contrast, the exit of the UK might also work as a trigger to 
rejuvenate projects that were previously abandoned – in part due to the 
harsh criticism voiced by the UK – like the CESL. 
                                                                                                             
133.  See Gebr. Weber GmbH v. Wittmer, Joined Cases C-65/09 & C-87/09, [2011] 
E.C.R. I-5295; Messner v. Krüger, C-489/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-7315; Quelle AG v. 
Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände, C-404/06, [2008] E.C.R. 
I-2713. 
134.  Regarding the methodological issue of interpreting ‘excessively implemented 
directives’ see further Habersack & Mayer, Die überschießende Umsetzung von Richtlinien, in 
EUROPÄISCHE METHODENLEHRE 297, 310 (Riesenhuber ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 3d ed.). 
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However, even in the areas where changes can be expected on a 
legislative level, the market might thrive towards a perpetuation of the 
status quo in order to remain competitive on the European market. 
There is no doubt that an EU without the UK will lead to a tragic 
loss for the remaining Member States in many ways. 135  Different 
approaches and guidelines initiated by the UK have shaped the EU and 
its legislation over the years. Most certainly, the EU would not have 
looked the same without the UK being part of it for over 45 years. The 
countless contributions of British businesses, judges and lawyers 
cannot be appreciated enough. Nevertheless, some of the guidelines 
and legislation within the EU law would have looked different without 
the UK’s constant insistence. It would not be wholly inaccurate to view 
the UK as a perpetual ‘loner’ whose wishes and many special 
agreements have caused an uncountable number of protracted and 
encumbering negotiations. 
But also the UK has, for its part, been influenced and shaped by 
EU politics and legal provisions. The economic, cultural and legal 
achievements have been implemented and have found their way into 
the British society. 
As shown above, it is exceedingly likely that the general 
approaches regarding law enforcement and liberal market regulations 
after Brexit will develop in different directions. Detrimental 
consequences have to be expected on both sides, but not everything has 
to be negative. In fact, a Brexit might even lead to the UK assuming a 
role model position. CMA as well as the Consumer Protection Act and 
the Consumer Rights Act do give hope in this respect. 
Whatever the final Brexit will look like, it still means the end of 
an era. It can be metaphorically described as a ‘divorce after a 
marriage’136 of over 45 years. As is common knowledge, family issues 
are a sensitive topic, involving many emotions that should be put aside 
when negotiating what is best for the future of the family members. 
Although separations are never easy, hope and faith should form a part 
of all such negotiations. Considering all of the legal problems, the 
process of Brexit is likely to take more than the two years allotted for 
                                                                                                             
135.  For a further analysis of costs and benefits, see Oliver, European and international 
views of Brexit, 23 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1321 (2016). 
136.  Skouris, Brexit - Rechtliche Vorgaben für den Austritt aus der EU, 27 EUZW 806, 
811 (2016). 
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negotiation.137 But it can be hoped that, in the end, both sides will 
overcome their pride, learning from each other’s approaches and 
adjusting the respective legislation in order to achieve a better 
consumer welfare. 
 
                                                                                                             
137.  Falter & Rüdel, Brexit, Anwendbare Rechtsquellen und Auswirkungen auf Verträge, 
8 GWR 475, 476 (2016). 
